When the popular uprising against the government of Syrian President Bashar Assad erupted some 10 months ago, Lebanon’s March 8 coalition was struggling to form a Cabinet.

As the crisis deepened, Hezbollah and its allies intensified their efforts to form a government that consolidated their power in Beirut, with their efforts succeeding three months later, in June.

And as the power struggle pitting Assad’s regime against opposition groups further escalated into armed violence, Hezbollah reluctantly overlooked Prime Minister Najib Mikati’s decision to fund the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, which was finally concluded in November.

Hezbollah had vowed to block at all costs the funding of the U.N.-backed court, which it dubbed an Israeli-U.S. tool, but had to step back from its previous positions in a bid to avoid the collapse of the Cabinet after Mikati threatened to resign if Lebanon failed to pay its dues.

That said, one cannot but notice the uptick in the March 8 camp’s attempts to strengthen its grip on power in Beirut as Assad’s regime stumbles in Damascus.

Likewise, March 14 parties seem to have endorsed the same hardball tactics, on the opposite side of the playfield.

Over the past few weeks, former Prime Minister Saad Hariri took the offensive after several months of cautious silence and launched public, scathing attacks against Assad, saying his rule was doomed to end soon.

While the Future Movement head and his ally Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea are predicting the fall of Assad, March 14 lawmakers are exploiting every potential opportunity to deal blows to the Hezbollah-dominated government.

As implied by Geagea on several occasions, March 14 groups believe Assad’s fall would inevitably put an end to Hezbollah’s dominance in Lebanon.

Several March 14 figures argue that if Assad falls, the cutting off of Iranian arms supplies to Hezbollah would transform the party’s current arsenal, over the passing of time, into a rusting stockpile.

Although the attempts by March 14 politicians might come across as nothing but verbal jousting, the struggle between the rival camps could stray from its peaceful path, as events further deteriorate in Syria in what appears to be an unfolding civil war.

In a first truly worrying sign after the bloody May 2008 clashes in Lebanon, when gunmen from Hezbollah and its allies reacted violently to a decision by the government of Fouad Siniora, reports have resurfaced of armed groups in the predominantly Sunni areas of Sidon, Tripoli and Akkar.

While doubts surround the true allegiances of these groups, which March 14 parties claim are funded by Hezbollah to instigate inter-Sunni strife, the security situation might spin out of control, irrespective of loyalties.

Recent media reports quoted Beirut MP Imad Hout, a pro-March 14 figure and Al-Jamaa al-Islamiya official, as saying that his party’s Al-Fajr Brigades, which he described as an armed resistance wing, would use its weapons to defend the nation.

Hout’s announcement drew criticism from the March 14 coalition, which sought immediate clarification, prompting Hout to later deny the reports, claiming that he was misquoted. “We had the honor of resisting the Zionist enemy during the [Israeli] invasion of 1982; I said we used arms – this is in the past tense,” Hout said. Irrespective of whether or not one believes Hout’s clarification, both the March 14 and 8 coalitions should reconsider their tactics as they confront the volatile situation.

March 14 should take the initiative by abandoning its current policy and instead seek to contain Hezbollah through dialogue, rather than corner an armed party as its Syrian ally stumbles. But with Hezbollah sensing the noose tightening, and March 14 groups feeling more empowered, a clash seems inevitable if both parties continue to rely on the same dangerous tactics.