Against speculations of an approaching crisis in Lebanon that might lead to an explosion similar to May 2008, reassurances are made to the contrary, that the Saudi-Syrian accord on peace in Lebanon will hold, and will continue to prevent a confrontation on the streets of Beirut.

The accord was achieved in Doha, Qatar, in 2008, when Saudi King Abdullah met with Syrian President Bashar Assad and reconciled their differences. Their agreement helped end the mini-civil war that took place in Lebanon in May of that year.

The two leaders renewed their pledge last month when things looked like they would fall apart again in Beirut. King Abdullah came to Damascus and parleyed with Assad, and then both flew to Beirut on the king’s private jet where they held a three-way summit with Lebanese President Michel Sleiman.

The recent rise in tensions in Lebanon surrounds the murder case of former Premier Rafik Hariri, and the anticipated report by the Hariri Probe Commission.

These tensions will not spiral into a repeat of May 7, 2008, when Hizbullah and its allies stormed Beirut by military force. Damascus and Riyadh have determined since then that peace and quiet will be maintained in Lebanon, and tensions should remain a domestic affair to keep Lebanese television audiences entertained. Visitors to Damascus are told so much: Lay low and resolve your domestic issues domestically!

Why would Syria and Saudi Arabia be so keen about Lebanon to the extent both made it the jewel of their rapprochement?

The reason lies in the common family legacy that both King Abdullah and Assad inherited from their fathers. This heritage was a lesson from the fathers on geo-politics and it states that it is in the best interest of their respective countries to work together.

Patrick Seale in his seminal biography on late President Hafiz Assad mentions an episode about King Abdel-Aziz, the founder of Saudi Arabia. In his last days, King Abdel-Aziz gathered his sons – Saud, Faisal, Fahed, and Abdullah – around him to give them a crash course on how to run the affairs of the vast and wealthy kingdom. Among the many things he had said was that Syria was important for Saudi security, which should take center-stage in Saudi regional policy.

He warned his sons not to let Syria go either with Iraq or with Egypt because that would isolate Saudi Arabia and enfeeble its clout and influence in the region. These sons later iterated that Syria should not be run over by Israel either, since Arabia itself would be the next prey.

Likewise, President Bashar Assad took a chapter from the experience of his clever father. As soon as Hafiz Assad became the leader of Syria in 1970, he opened up to Saudi Arabia and refrained from the revolutionary talk of his predecessors that divided Arabs into “reactionaries” and “progressives.” Assad, the father, judged that, Syria as a confrontation state with Israel could not afford such revolutionary luxuries of labeling brotherly Arabs.

Saudis answered in kind and resumed relations with Damascus which reached unprecedented scales. Political and economic co-operation was maximized, hundreds of thousands of Syrians found jobs in the kingdom, and King Faisal cut oil supplies to Western countries aiding Israel to help Syria’s war efforts in 1973-74.

In September 1979, the Saudi support was sorely needed by President Hafiz Assad, seeing that Anwar Sadat, president of Egypt and his partner in war, had signed a peace treaty with Israel and left Syria totally exposed to Israeli power. When Hafiz tried to create a united front with Iraq, Saddam Hussein, the strong man of Baghdad, rebuffed him. Hafiz found solace in Saudi Arabia, even if the Saudis were not as belligerent against Israel.

The young Bashar started in ernest to improve Syria’s fortunes, but to his bad luck, soon clouds gathered over Iraq. He spent a few years in the wilderness in his steadfast position regarding the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, and after the murder of Hariri in 2005. Both events worsened Syria’s position. That’s why the Doha meet in 2008 was a new opening in ties between Syria and Saudi Arabia.

King Abdel-Aziz’s prophecy has stood the test of time for the third or the fourth time.

Now, how did the new found friendship between Syria and Saudi translate on the ground in Beirut?

In March 2005, Lebanon was divided into two warring camps: The “March 8 Coalition,” largely loyal to Syria, and the “14 March Coalition,” which, everybody thought was loyal to Saudi Arabia.

However, the Saudi-Syrian rapprochement in 2008 uncovered the reality that loyalties in Lebanon were not as linear as they seemed. In the “March 14 Coalition,” some had strong ties to Egypt (e.g., former Premier Fouad Sinora), while others had ties with the US and other Western countries, and yet some others even had no qualms mentioning their old ties to Israel.

Saad Hariri, to his credit, proved easy to bring along and follow the steps of his ally Walid Jumblatt. Hariri not only visited Damascus and dined with Assad on many occasions, but has made the giant step of dropping all signs of animosity and defiance toward Syria that marked his behavior over the past five years. Also, Egypt’s nose was out of joint watching the Syrian-Saudi rapprochement in Lebanon.

Egypt sounded eager to maintain its role by activating its contacts inside the country and by inviting some March 14 leaders, such as Christian leader Samir Geagea, while Siniora was a regular visitor to Cairo. Among the political class of Lebanon who were invited to meet and greet Assad and Abdullah in the Lebanese Presidential Palace, Geagea was left out.

Junior members in the March 14 Camp, that is the Christian parties, who built their discourse on animosity toward Syria and on marching to the tunes of the Hariri murder case, did not sit still and would let Mr. Hariri Jr. mend Lebanon’s relations with Syria. They were not happy with Hariri Jr’s change of heart.

In the other political camp in Lebanon, the “March 8 Coalition,” positions were much docile: Almost all its constituent members agreed to forgive and forget the past and go along with the Syrian-Saudi accord, with the exception of General Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, which cannot be seen as loyal to Syria due to its sensitivity to Christian public opinion in Lebanon.

Aoun opened a barrage against the government and its leader despite the Saudi-Syrian accord. But Aoun alone cannot cause too much trouble, and his actions were a sign of health of Lebanese democracy. So what went wrong if all was so well?

As mentioned earlier, the Saudi-Syrian accord has made it iron-clad that the Lebanese are not allowed to fight it over by guns. But short of an open conflict, the accord allowed them to fight with words, which they are very good at. Hariri is caught in between: He wants to lead the government and play ball with Syria and with his Saudi patrons, yet he needs to meet the wishes of his Sunni constituency and bring justice and truth in the murder of his father.

If the current conflict brings tensions to the television screens (Westerners are encouraged to watch the antics of Lebanese political talk shows), or even if it leads to some street fighting and protests, the Saudis and their Syrian brothers are more than eager to intervene again and bring sense to the trigger-happy Lebanese. This also means Damascus and Riyadh will not allow any one side to make gains against the other in the delicate balance in the current Cabinet.

The current conflict over the international tribunal was ignited by the leak that members of Hizbullah may be named in the murder case. The Syrians and Saudis will do the best they can to ease the tension, but if the Lebanese insist on spilling blood, then civil peace will be threatened. There remains the call from Walid Jumblatt who advised that it was better to shut down the tribunal if it will harm civil peace in Lebanon. He reasoned that it was “cheaper” for Lebanon to do without the tribunal rather than risk a costly civil war.

Kamal Dib is a Canadian economist with research interests in Lebanon, the Middle East and an observer of German culture. He can be reached at: kamaldib@videotron.ca