BEIRUT: The Arab Spring is redrawing the regional geopolitical map, with Turkey and Qatar taking an assertive foreign policy role in the Middle East. Once divided between a Saudi-led alliance of “Arab moderates” and an Iranian-led coalition often referred to as the “defiant axis,” the region is now trying to catch up with the changes caused by popular uprisings.

For more than 20 years Saudi Arabia and Egypt formed the core of the so-called Arab moderates, with Syria and Iran at the heart of the opposing camp. When the Arab Spring first blossomed in Tunisia, that power structure seemed unaffected; the situation was less alarming to the traditional powers given the prior marginal role of the small North African country in Middle East politics. Only when the uprising reached the streets of Egypt and later Syria did the status quo start to shake.

“The traditional power structure is breaking down. We are now seeing many alliances on different issues, but as most traditional powers are witnessing various types of transitions, a new phenomenon is emerging. We are seeing independently minded states such as Qatar and Turkey playing a much bigger role,” said Salman Shaikh, director of Brookings Doha Center in Qatar.

“Qatar is allied to the United States but pursues an independent policy,” Shaikh explained, citing the example of Qatar’s relations with Palestinian Islamist group Hamas, as well as its general position on the Palestinian issue. “Similarly, Turkey is a NATO member, but it also has its independent policy on many issues, particularly on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and its relations with Muslim Brotherhood groups,” he added.

Shaikh said that the increasing bond between GCC countries, mainly the alliance between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, is probably the only clear coalition that has so far emerged from the Arab Spring.

One year ago, it would have been hard to predict that Qatar, one of the smallest Arab states, would be punching above its weight in the Middle East today. Even the most optimistic about Qatar’s potential could not predict that the Gulf state would be one day leading the Arab League and speaking on its behalf.

The year of the Arab Spring has brought political change to several Arab countries, but even more so to Arab foreign policy with Qatar stepping in as a force in Middle East politics.

“I would not judge Qatar’s foreign policy as smart or not. I’d say it’s relevant,” Shaikh said.

Qatar’s foreign policy, spearheaded by Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassem al-Thani, has long been an issue of debate. The country, which hosts two U.S. military bases, enjoyed fairly good ties with Iran and groups like Palestinian Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah, while maintaining at the same time commercial ties with Israel. It was Qatar’s emir, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani who received a hero’s welcome in south Lebanon, a Hezbollah stronghold, in summer 2010 after his country contributed to rebuilding the hugely devastated area following Israel’s 2006 war on its northern neighbor. But supporters of the Lebanese Shiite group took down posters thanking Qatar for its role in rebuilding southern towns when the emir changed his policy toward Syrian President Bashar Assad, a close ally of the group.

“Qatar is small in size but not in economy, and the size of an economy matters in politics,” said Paul Salem, the director of the Beirut office of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Qatar was very active in diplomacy even before the Arab Spring, but I cannot think of a specific interest that the country is pursuing through its expanding role. Qatar has no interests at stake. Its Arab Spring policy seems to be policy for policy’s sake,” Salem said.

But, he added, a “Sunni revival via supporting mainstream Islamist groups in the countries that are witnessing change could make sense from a GCC security perspective to confront Iran.”

“Qatar does not necessarily have an Islamist agenda. Both Qatar and Turkey have maintained good ties with all dissidents [Islamist and others] in past years, hence they are now building on such relations,” said Brooking’s Sheikh. “The fact that they have maintained such relations enables them to play a bigger role in the Arab League, besides the fact that the traditional Arab leading powers are all witnessing change, thus leaving a gap that Qatar is now filling,” he added.

Not to be underestimated in discussions about Qatar’s Arab Spring policy is the role of Al-Jazeera satellite channel. Al-Jazeera has openly supported the uprising in Tunisia, played a significant role in making the voice of Egypt’s Tahrir Square heard across the Arab world, offered the opponents of Libya’s fallen leader Moammar Gadhafi an influential media platform, and is now doing the same with Syria’s opposition. The channel, however did attract criticism for its coverage of protests in Bahrain, when the rule of a Gulf Sunni minority faced an unprecedented challenge from a predominantly Shiite uprising.

“The Qataris are good readers of Arab public opinion and this is clearly reflected in the coverage of Al-Jazeera,” Shaikh said. “Saying that Qatar or Al-Jazeera were responsible for directing events is over-simplistic. They just went with the flow. They did not give Bahrain the same attention they gave to other countries for obvious reasons but at the same time Al-Jazeera was not outspoken about championing the Bahraini royal family,” he added.

Turkey, which once enjoyed a powerful colonial history in the Middle East under the Ottomans, has benefited from the Arab Spring with an improved image as a champion of Arab people against dictatorial force. Turkey’s appeal to Arab masses actually began earlier, with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s row with Israel over the 2010 Gaza flotilla debacle, which saw Israeli forces shoot dead eight Turkish nationals and one American of Turkish descent. Erdogan’s Palestine policy had earlier prompted Hezbollah chief Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah to hold a pro-Turkey rally in the southern suburbs of Beirut. The group’s supporters are no big fans of Erdogan now following his current Syria policy.

“Turkey is not a new power, but its new kind of influence is based on the popularity it won by championing Palestine and the Arab Spring,” said Paul Salem. “Another reason why Turkey is gaining more influence in Arab politics is its ruling party (AKP), which is a successful model of Islam and democracy,” he added.

Saudi Arabia, a traditional regional powerhouse, was first alarmed as it witnessed the downfall of Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, a key ally of Riyadh. However the kingdom, together with other Gulf countries, mainly Qatar and the UAE, was not entirely alienated by the outcome of the Egyptian uprising with a friendly military council in power and a state preparing to reshape itself. “Saudi Arabia continues to play an influential role in the Middle East. I would not refer to it as an old power, but a remaining one,” Salem said.

However, a point against Saudi Arabia, according to Salem, was that a new Egypt could in the future become a returning power that would compete for a bigger regional role. “Under Mubarak, Egypt’s foreign policy was unpopular among Arabs, but now Egypt is in a good position to play a more influential role, especially if it adopts a popular form of Sunni Islam, at least one that is more popular than that of Saudi Arabia,” he said.

The Gulf kingdom is not perfectly immune to the wave of uprisings that has swept the Arab world, with a minority Shiite population demanding more rights and a larger segment of the population demanding reforms.

Saudi women have dared for the first time defy a driving ban in what seemed to be a Saudi fruit of the Arab Spring. “Saud Arabia is also witnessing its own transition. It is not as painful as the other transitions we are seeing, but it is happening gradually,” Shaikh said.

Iran, Saudi Arabia’s arch foe, rushed to speak in favor of uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, and went further to compare those to the Iranian revolution of 1979 while celebrating the fall of Mubarak, an opponent of Iranian foreign policy.

But Iran quickly changed course when the popular movement threatened its strategic ally, Syrian President Bashar Assad. Iran did not go as far as condemning the revolt against Assad, but is apparently doing its best to see its ally stay in power after introducing some reforms to his four-decade old system. “Iran is at risk of losing more than Saudi Arabia because of the situation in Syria,” Salem said.

Yet, Iran’s first and foremost challenge, according to Shaikh, is the internal pressure it is facing.

“Iran is a strong regional actor but its system might break down from within under domestic pressure by reformist youth groups and international pressure through sanctions,” he said. “The Syria challenge adds to Iran’s problems and it will definitely try to win Iraq on its side in the future.”

Predominantly Shiite Iraq is witnessing a major wave of violence following the recent withdrawal of U.S. troops. The violence is coupled with a serious political crisis that is taking the shape of a Sunni-Shiite conflict. The rapidly disintegrating country could well be the battlefield for traditional and emerging powers in the post-Arab Spring Middle East.