A recent report by a European country says that the current phase of the Syrian crisis is a dangerous blend of high regional and international strategic stakes, and positions that are charged with sectarian attitudes and political desires.

The report addresses the path of the Syrian crisis, where domestic, regional and international factors have intertwined to such an extent that the conflict in the country has become a struggle that surpasses removing autocratic rule, establishing democracy, pluralism and regular transfer of power.

According to the report, “it is still uncertain whether the crisis in Syria has entered its final stage or not. But there is no doubt that it has entered its most dangerous state yet.”

The report continues to say that “with changes in dynamics, reactions – whether by Syria or the international community that opposes the regime – range from hysterical challenges by supporters of the regime to the optimism of protesters about a coming end to the bloody axis, to fears of sectarian acts of vengeance or civil war. These fears are not uncommon, and give those who are betting that the Syrian crisis will shift the regional balance of power away from the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis a feeling of victory.”

The report indicates that the missing component in all of these reactions is a solid evaluation of the challenges that changes in Syria will mean, and the danger that these changes will lead to an obstruction of a successful power transfer, or even stop it completely.

The report lists five issues – missing from public discussion – that could have direct repercussions on the development of the Syrian situation:

1. The fate of the Alawite sect, in light of the fears aired by some on how minorities will be dealt with in Syria if the regime falls.

2. The link between Lebanon and Syria is a major determinant in the course of the crisis. The West has been content with asking Lebanon to increase surveillance of its borders to prevent an influx of weapons and fighters, but it has ignored the reciprocal feelings of solidarity between Syrian protesters and many Lebanese. These feelings were demonstrated at the March 14 rally, held earlier this week, on the seventh anniversary of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri’s killing – when a message by the Syrian National Council was read.

3. The nature of increasing international involvement and its repercussions for the conflict has been transformed to one between the U.S. and its allies, and Russia and China and their allies.

4. The long-term effect of the militarization of the protest movement, as shown by collisions between Syrian forces and the Free Syrian Army.

5. The leftovers of social, economic, and institutional disintegration. Some compare the Syrian crisis to the Lebanese Civil War which, by its end, had afflicted the country’s economy, social life, infrastructure, and public institutions.

The European report states that many, both in and outside Syria, are betting on the imminent fall of the regime and expect that things can only get better after this event. But such optimism is unjustified. The SNC’s draft political program presented an image of a completely peaceful movement, suffering from brutal repression. As for the regime and its allies, they describe the crisis as a domestic manifestation of a vicious regional and international dispute.

Both of these narratives ignore a central issue – that a successful end to this increasingly internationalized crisis depends on a clear understanding of the area between these two narratives.