Prior to 2009, Islamists in Kuwait were not regarded as an opposition force to the government. In fact, many Kuwaitis believed that former Crown Prince and Prime Minister Sheikh Saad al-Abdullah sided with the Islamists in the 1980s and 1990s against leftists and liberals.

However, in the past two years, the Muslim Brotherhood has changed significantly. Its political organization, the Islamic Constitutional Movement (or Hadas, its Arabic acronym) has played a prominent role in rallying against Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser al-Mohammad al-Sabah – a liberal-leaning member of the ruling family with extensive diplomatic experience but accused of corruption since his first appointment in February 2006. Nasser al-Mohammad finally resigned from office on Nov. 29 and has since been replaced by Jaber al-Mubarak al-Hamad al-Sabah, his former defense minister.

The ousting of Nasser al-Mohammad is a rare event in Kuwaiti history. He resigned previously seven times and only now has he been replaced by Jaber al-Mubarak. Prior to 2006, parliamentarians refrained from confrontation with the prime minister, as he was also crown prince (therefore, the future emir). When the office of prime minister was separated from the title of crown prince, the prime minister lost the emir’s prerogative of immunity, becoming subject to parliamentary inquiry. The resulting stalemate has left Kuwait’s Cabinet in a deadlock: As parliament submitted requests to question the Cabinet, the emir dissolved parliament, resulting in three separate dissolutions between 2006 and 2009. The Cabinet also resigned seven times in efforts to escape parliamentary inquiry.

In the midst of parliamentary opposition to Nasser al-Mohammad, Hadas was initially not very vocal. The critical turning point came in 2009 during development of “the fourth oil refinery project” – a contract worth $15 billion that would eventually replace the aging Shuaiba plant and expand national oil production. Parliamentarians cited illegal procedural mistakes in its approval and threatened to grill the oil minister, Mohammad al-Olaim – a Hadas party member – for lack of transparency. After receiving the Audit Bureau report which stated that the Kuwait National Petroleum Company did not adhere to the committee regulations, Nasser al-Mohammad postponed the project indefinitely.

Hadas felt betrayed (having backed Olaim). In reaction, it requested to grill the prime minister himself – accusing him of squandering public funds in personal expenses and stalling development plans for the project. The arguments they presented were poorly sustained and damaged their own credibility. Their countermove was generally perceived as an unprincipled reaction against the prime minister’s withdrawal of support for a Hadas member. This contributed to Hadas’ defeat in the May 2009 elections. Only two members won seats, mainly due to tribal connections: Jimaan al-Hirbish (who belongs to the Eniza tribe) and Falah al-Sawagh (of the Awazm). In 2006, the party had six seats in total.

Since the oil refinery confrontation, the party has focused on regaining popularity. Hirbish and Sawagh have forged alliances with other parliamentarians, throwing their cards in with the Popular Action Bloc – led by a former parliament head, Ahmad al-Saadon, and the popular parliamentarian Musalam al-Barrak. Beyond their stance against Nasser al-Mohammad, Hadas and the Popular Action Bloc do not share political agendas.

Hadas has also claimed credit for galvanizing opposition outside parliament. The calls for Nasser al-Mohammad’s departure rose to a new level in December 2010 when riot police dispersed a political gathering in the house of Hadas’ Hirbish. An attendee, a professor of constitutional law at Kuwait University, Obaid al-Wasmi, was brutally beaten and later detained for “insulting and resisting security officers” and “inciting political unrest.” The incident galvanized the opposition into demanding the prime minister’s resignation.

Later, when Sheikh Jaber al-Mubarak was appointed prime minister, not only did Hadas immediately offer its congratulations, it also claimed credit for the turnover. Last week, parliamentarians and political figures gathered in Hirbish’s house again for the one-year anniversary of the December 2010 incident as a reminder that the successful movement against Nasser al-Mohammad started from the house of a Hadas parliamentarian.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, Hadas has called for parliament to be dissolved on the basis that it must be rid of Nasser al-Mohammad’s “bribed MPs.” Hirbish, now Hadas’ main figure, led those calls in press releases in the past months alongside Mohammad al-Dalal, the Hadas spokesman candidate in the coming parliamentary elections. This is a clear attempt to use Nasser al-Mohammad’s exit and the party’s revamped image to bolster their numbers in the upcoming Feb. 4 elections, which may succeed.

On the other hand, liberals are expected to lose seats, as Hadas and the Popular Action Bloc have attacked them for being passive towards the prime minister. Although the liberal Kuwait Nationalist Bloc took a clear stance against Nasser al-Mohammad and voted against him in the no-confidence vote last January, it failed to organize public protests. Rather than form their own campaigns and call for public support, liberals rode the coattails of other opposition movements. And they denounced the storming of parliament saying it was illegal to break in a public property. Their popular base has interpreted these moves as a sign of weakness and hesitation.

A Muslim Brotherhood comeback will not be as major as in Egypt – since Hadas has never won more than six (out of 50) seats in parliament. But it will significantly alter alliances and how these might be used (or abused) to serve the opposition. For one, pro-government independent parliamentarians might not get re-elected as several were summoned for interrogation for allegedly receiving bribes from Nasser al-Mohammad. This may create more opportunities for Islamists and the Action Bloc to win more seats and unite to form a coalitional majority.

Those who will definitely not ally with Hadas and the opposition bloc will be Shiite parliamentarians who were close to Nasser al-Mohammad and the independent parliamentarians – who are mainly passive, focused on repaying services to their voters by siding with the government when needed.

It is not yet clear what the new era of Jaber al-Mubarak will bring. His new Cabinet retains all former ministers except for three who resigned in protest against the ongoing political tension. Regardless, it is significant that Nasser al-Mohammad was replaced and that the emir has sought to end the tense deadlock.

Mona Kareem is a journalist and poet. This commentary first appeared at Sada, an online journal published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.