Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, many observers, mainly from the United States, have portrayed Turkey as a “model” country that the newly liberated Arab states should aspire to emulate.
Led by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) since 2002, Turkey has been portrayed as a prosperous Muslim state with high levels of economic growth and political stability and the only Muslim country that has strived to consolidate liberal democracy for over half a century, albeit with mixed results. This success is largely attributed to the ability of Turkey to be outwardly secular, with a strong sense of national identity and a willingness to embrace economic achievement, while maintaining a steadfast commitment to its Muslim heritage.
There are two immediate problems with projecting this model. Foremost is a lack of demand. Countries such as Egypt and Libya are reluctant to draw from the Turkish blueprint. On a recent visit to Egypt in September 2011, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was greeted warmly by crowds of Egyptians, but only until he called upon them to adopt a “secular” state model. If recent elections in Egypt are anything to go by, there is strong public backing there for Islamists. Following the ousting of Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi, the government has hinted of its intention to base a new Constitution on Islam.
The Arab world has been impressed with Turkey’s recent ability to take a tough stance against Israel, and countries of the region are equally impressed with Turkey’s ability under Erdogan to create an economic powerhouse in the region. However, this does not readily translate into a desire by regional countries to adopt a state-society model based on Kemalist secularism.
More recently, Turkey’s own democratic credentials have come under increased criticism. Since the 1940s, the country has achieved penetrating changes in broadening freedoms. Turks are infinitely freer today then they were even 10 years ago to express their religious, ethnic and even sexual identities.
Despite this, however, there are worries that the country’s judiciary is jailing numerous individuals and delaying the process of fair trials. Recently, journalists, academics, even military officials were arrested, all of whom have been accused of belonging to Ergenekon, a clandestine organization allegedly involved in trying to bring down the government. Similarly, despite bold promises by the government to resolve the Kurdish question, the recent unintentional bombing and killing of 35 civilians of Kurdish origin has heightened tensions between Turks and Kurds.
Beyond these issues there lies a more deep-seated problem. Even if there was Arab interest in the Turkish model, this still might not be sufficient to help transform post-revolutionary regimes in Libya, Syria and Egypt into state formations typified by procedural and institutional democracy. Turkey simply has had a longer track record of being exposed to the conditions under which many forms of democracy thrive – procedural, institutional and liberal.
Turkey began engaging in competitive parliamentary politics in 1946. Prior to this, the country experienced a prolonged period of single party rule (1923-1946) initiated by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, during which time a complex process of social engineering was attempted to transform the country from a theocratic empire into a modern state. It was during this period and subsequent years that Turkey emerged as a state entity typified by secular legal, educational, judicial and social structures, and saw the demise and eventual subjugation of religion and religious authorities to the state.
One must not make the mistake of thinking that Turkey’s ability to internalize and institutionalize secular structures and practices was entirely the work of the country’s Kemalist elite. Kemal and his associates were the last in a long line of revolutionaries who were successful in consolidating opportunities initiated during the 19th century. A cursory look at the Ottoman Empire at that time shows that the seeds of questioning absolutist government, the birth of skepticism and empiricism, ideas relating to modern statecraft as witnessed in the creation and training of new bureaucratic and military elites, and the powerful forces of nationalist zeal were all experienced in the last great attempt to reform the empire.
The question of “how to save the empire” from final dissolution throughout its last century of existence led to a great reform effort known as the “Tanzimat.” It was during this era (1839-1876) that intellectuals and revolutionaries came to realize that the age of empires had to give way to the age of states. Ottoman lands, and Turks within political and economic administrations, had concrete experiences with secular institutional arrangements, particularly throughout the second half of the 19th century. This included the creation of an Ottoman Constitution and the opening of an Ottoman Parliament, as well as promulgation of secular trade laws.
While none of these institutional arrangements can be described as having established democratic governance, the seeds of questioning absolutist government were compounded by growing disdain in the minds of the elites for religious ruling classes. Turkey’s imperfect democratic model has had the benefit of nearly two centuries of development, while Arab countries emerging from dictatorial regimes have had no comparable experience.
Turkey first opened its national parliament in 1920, in wartime, without external assistance and based on its own will. That parliament’s legitimacy has never been questioned; its longevity is a testament to the strength of the country’s process of political and institutional modernization. In contrast, the U.S. military only recently pulled out of Iraq, and that country’s ability to ensure its unity and parliamentary system looks uncertain at best. It is likely that many countries of the Arab Spring will experience slow and painful change, typified by weak democratic governance and even possible transitions into new forms of elected authoritarianism.
Sinan Ciddi is executive director of the Institute of Turkish Studies at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. He authors the politics section of the Economist Intelligence Unit’s monthly country report on Turkey. This commentary was first published at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.