Shortly after the Eurogroup meeting of eurozone finance ministers on June 27, 2015, I bumped into a worried-looking Mario Draghi, the head of the European Central Bank.
Journalists find it natural to assume that Draghi and I had a hostile relationship during the 2015 standoff between Greece, which I represented, and the ECB.
In the eurozone, however, political constraints force the central bank to inflict the kind of damage Draghi's ECB visited upon our stock exchange that February afternoon.
Under Draghi's leadership, the ECB violated the raison d'etre of a central bank on other occasions.
Going beyond Greece, under Draghi's leadership, the ECB adopted instruments that intentionally misdirected enormous sums of public money.
Without QE, which involved creating approximately 2.7 trillion euros ($3 trillion) to help countries like Italy roll over their public debt and stay in the eurozone, the euro would not exist today.
Nonetheless, it is absurd that for every euro that Draghi's ECB printed to buy Italian public debt, it created 2 euros to buy German public debt.
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